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Recent Developments
Kadic v. Karadzic: Whose International Law?
AMY E. ECKERT
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in
Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala,1 a number of foreign plaintiffs have pursued
their tort claims in American federal courts under the the Alien Tort
Claims Act (ATCA). The ATCA allows the district courts to exercise
"original jurisdiction of any civil action by any alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States."2 Although the ATCA dates back to the Judiciary Act of 1789,
it was largely ignored prior to the Filartiga decision. ATCA jurisdiction
had been sustained in only two cases prior to Filartiga.3 In addition to
the rarity of cases in which courts sustained ATCA jurisdiction, the
denial of ATCA jurisdiction in several other claims "created the im-
pression that the law of nations.. . could not be violated when the
victim was a national of the acting state."4 After the Filartiga deci-
sion, use of the ATCA to gain access to federal courts increased dra-
matically.
While Judge John 0. Newman, writing for the Court of Appeals,
noted that "[m]ost Americans would probably be surprised to learn
that victims of atrocities committed in Bosnia are suing the leader of
1. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1993).
3. Jurisdiction was sustained in Bolchos v. Darrell, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C.
1795)(The District Court accepted jurisdiction for a claim that slaves belonging to a
Spanish subject but seized on board a British ship should be returned) and Adra v.
Clift, 195 F.Supp. 857 (D.Md. 1961)(The District Court exercised jurisdiction over a
child custody claim between a Lebanese national and an Iraqi national).
4. Jeffrey M. Blum and Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over Interna-
tional Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act after Filartiga v. Peria-Irala,
22 HARV. INTL L.J. 53, 55 (1981).
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the insurgent Bosnian-Serb forces in a United States District Court in
Manhattan,"5 Kadic v. Karadzic represents just the latest link in a
chain of tort claims against aliens litigated in the U.S. Since the com-
parative flood of ATCA litigation after the Filartiga opinion,6 many
aspects of this statue have received significant attention from legal
scholars as well as litigants. The scholarly debates over the ATCA
center largely around the origins and purpose of the statute7 and its
application to violations by private individuals as opposed to state ac-
tors.8 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals' recent decision in Kadic v.
Karadzic brings to the forefront yet another question about ATCA
claims, that being which international legal obligations apply when
determining whether or not a violation of international law has taken
place.
Kadic v. Karazdic involves appeals by two groups of plaintiffs who
have suffered human rights violations in the course of the conflict in
the former Yugoslavia. These plaintiffs sued Karadzic for the human
rights violations, including genocide, rape and torture.9 In their appel-
late briefs, both the plaintiffs and defendant alternately alleged that
Karadzic acted as a private individual and as President of Srpska, the
Bosnian Serb entity which declared its independence from Bosnia-
Herzegovina.1° The Court of Appeals found that Srpska meets the
requirements of statehood under international law, in spite of a lack of
recognition from other states.11 However, the Court failed to consider
the implications of Srpska's statehood for the determination of
Srpska's obligations under international law, as well as any violations
of these obligations. Principles of state succession and customary inter-
national law can potentially create significant differences in the obliga-
tions which bind the United States and those which bind Srpska.
5. 70 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1995).
6. As noted above, prior to the Filartiga decision, courts had sustained ATCA
jurisdiction in only two cases. Since Filartiga, a number of foreign tort claimants
have alleged ATCA jurisdiction in U.S. courts, particularly in claims of human rights
violations. One of the most notable of these is In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights
Litigation, 910 F.Supp 1460 (D. Haw. 1995).
7. See Anthony D'Amato, The Alien Tort Statute and the Founding of the Con-
stitution, 82 AM. J. INTL L. 62 (1988); William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of
the Alien Tort Statute: A Response to the "Originalists" 19 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 221 (1996); and Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judicia-
ry Act of 1789: A Badge of Honor, 83 AM. J. INTL L. 461 (1989).
8. See John M. Rogers, The Alien Tort Statute and How Individuals 'Violate'
International Law 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 47 (1988).
9. 70 F.3d at 237
10. 70 F.3d at 239
11. 70 F.3d at 243. While recognition undeniably carries important political and
legal consequences, a lack of recognition does not defeat the unrecognized state's
existence or permit non-recognizing states to treat the entity as anything but a




These differences raise the important question of which standard ap-
propriately determines the "violation of international law" required for
jurisdiction under the ATCA: the standard according to American obli-
gations or Srpskan obligations. Applying the American standard may
hold Srpska to obligations set forth in treaties to which Srpska is not a
party. The effect of this would be to create new obligations instead of
enfocring pre-existing obligations.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The District Court's Dismissal
In Kadic v. Karadzic, the two groups of Bosnian plaintiffs ap-
pealed from dismissals in District Court.12 In District Court, Judge
Peter K Leisure dismissed both claims for lack of subject-matter juris-
diction.13 In their complaints, the plaintiffs alleged genocide, rape,
forced prostitution and impregnation, torture, and other cruel, inhu-
man, and degrading treatment, assault and battery, sex and ethnic
inequality, summary execution, and wrongful death.14 Plaintiffs as-
serted subject-matter jurisdiction for these claims under the ATCA as
well as the Torture Victim Protection Act (the Torture Victim Act) and
28 U.S.C. § 1331.1' The Court had personal jurisdiction over Karadzic
through personal service while he was present in the Southern District
of New York. In each claim, Karadzic was served personally with a
summons and complaint while he was present in Manhattan on invita-
tion from the United Nations. 6 In District Court, Karadzic moved for
dismissal on four grounds: (1) insufficient service of process, (2) lack of
personal jurisdiction, (3) lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and (4)
nonjusticiability of the plaintiffs' claims."
Without addressing the other issues raised, the District Court
Judge dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 8
Judge Leisure alluded to the question of justiciability, by noting that
the Executive Branch could recognize Karazdic as the head of state of
a friendly nation, thereby entitling Karazdic to head of state immunity
and transforming the plaintiffs' claims against Karazdic into a request
for an advisory opinion. 9 This potential, while not dispositive of the
jurisdictional issues, weighed against the exercise of jurisdiction by the
District Court in his opinion.0
12. 70 F.3d at 236.
13. Id.
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Noting this possible problem, Judge Leisure turned to the ques-
tion of subject-matter jurisdiction. Asserting that non-state actors
could not violate international law, and that the Bosnian Serb entity,
"Srpska," was not a recognized state, Judge Leisure held that the
ATCA could not provide subject-matter jurisdiction because Karadzic,
as a private actor, could not violate international law.21 Similarly,
because Srpska was not a state, Karadzic could not have acted "under
the color of law" of a foreign nation as required by the Torture Victim
Act.22 Judge Leisure's view that no state action was involved, along
with a belief that express Congressional authorization was necessary
to create a cause of action, led the District Judge to reject the Section
1331 argument as well.2" The District Court's opinion did not address
the plaintiffs' alternative argument that Karazdic acted in concert with
Yugoslavia, a recognized state.
B. The Court of Appeals Reverses
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's
dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims and remanded the cases for proceed-
ings on the merits of the case.2" In preparation for the appeal, the
parties had briefed the issues of subject-matter jurisdiction, the basis
of the dismissal, as well as personal jurisdiction and justiciability."5
Karadzic asked the Court of Appeals to affirm the District Court's
dismissal on any of these three grounds.28 While the District Court
had dismissed the complaints on subject-matter jurisdiction alone, the
Court of Appeals addressed each of these three issues.
1. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
The Court commenced its review by reconsidering the question of
subject-matter jurisdiction, which constituted the basis of the District
Court's dismissal. This review included an examination of three poten-
tial bases for subject-matter jurisdiction: the Torture Victim Act, Sec-
tion 1331 and the ATCA. The Court of Appeals held that the Torture
Victim Act created a cause of action but could not alone confer subject-
matter jurisdiction.2 7 To assert this cause of action, the plaintiffs
must base subject-matter jurisdiction in the ATCA or Section 1331.
While the Court also addressed Section 1331 jurisdiction, it pointed
out that the issue of specific Congressional authorization of the
plaintiffs' cause of action was moot in this case because the causes of
21. Id.
22. 70 F.3d at 238.
23. Id.
24. 70 F.3d at 251.
25. 70 F.3d at 238.
26. Id.




action asserted by the plaintiffs were statutorily authorized by the
ATCA and the Torture Victim Act.29 The Court of Appeals chose to
rest subject-matter jurisdiction on the ATCA.' °
The ATCA endows the District Courts with original jurisdiction
over aliens' tort claims if the tort is also a violation of international
law or a treaty of the United States."' Because subject-matter juris-
diction under the ATCA depends upon a violation of international law,
the Court of Appeals noted that "this statute requires a more
searching review of the merits than is required under the more flexible
'arising under' standard of section 1331." 32 Before conducting a
searching review of the merits of the plaintiffs' claims, the Court first
addressed the threshold issue of whether non-state actors can commit
violations of international law. The Court of Appeals rejected the Dis-
trict Court's view that only states could violate international law, stat-
ing that "certain forms of conduct violate the law of nations whether
undertaken by those acting under the auspices of a state or only as
private individuals."3 In support of this position, the Court cited pira-
cy as an early example of individual conduct that violated internation-
al law, and slave trading and war crimes as more contemporary exam-
ples." Moreover, the two pre-Filartiga ATCA cases in which jurisdic-
tion was sustained, Adra v. Clift and Bolchos v. Darrell, dealt with
conduct by private individuals. 5
To bolster his claim that the District Court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction, Karadzic contended that because the Torture Victim Act
requires state action, this requirement also attaches to any claim un-
der the ATCA.'8 The Court rejected this argument as well. Relying on
the legislative history behind the Torture Victim Act, the Court stated
that Congress' enactment of the Torture Victim Act left the scope of
the ATCA undiminished. 7 Congress intended the Torture Victim Act
to codify the Filatriga decision in light of attacks on it, primarily from
Judge Bork in his concurring opinion in the Tel-Oren case. 8 Recogniz-
ing that the scope of torts under international law extended beyond
torture and summary execution, Congress intentionally left the ATCA
intact to address those additional torts, as well as potential future
torts which may result from continually-evolving rules of customary
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. 28 U.S.C. §1350 (1988).
32. 30 F.3d 232 at 238.
33. 30 F.3d 232 at 239.
34. Id.
35. 70 F.3d at 240.
36. 70 F.3d at 241.
37. 70 F.3d at 241.
38. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 760 F.2d 774, 233 U.S. App. D.C. 384
(1984).
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international law."9
Having disposed of these objections by the defense and established
subject matter jurisdiction, the Court proceeded to conduct its search-
ing review of the violations alleged by the plaintiffs. For purposes of
this review, the court grouped the plaintiffs' claims into three broad
categories: genocide, war crimes, and torture. Citing its previous deci-
sion in Amerada Hess, the Court noted the need to examine "evolving
standards of international law" to determine the scope of subject-mat-
ter jurisdiction under the ATCA.4° Bearing in mind this consideration,
the Court continued by analyzing the substantive law prohibiting the
three categories of violations alleged by the plaintiffs.
Looking first to the allegations of genocide, the Court noted that
after the Second World War, the prohibition against genocide quickly
gained acceptance by states." As evidence of this prohibition, the
Court cited the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide42 and the Genocide Convention Implementation
Act of 1987." Both the Genocide Convention and the Genocide Con-
vention Implementation Act prohibit genocide regardless of whether
the persons committing the genocidal acts are state officials or private
individuals." Because of this prohibition against genocide, the Court
of Appeals held that the District Court has subject matter jurisdiction
over the claims of genocide.45
Similarly, the laws of war, as codified after World War II in the
Geneva Conventions, prohibit violations by private individuals. 6
Common Article 3, which is contained in all four Geneva Conventions,
sets forth some of the key prohibitions of violence against non-combat-
ants. These types of crimes are the ones which the plaintiffs claim that
Karadzic and his troops committed. Consequently, the Court of Ap-
peals found that the District Court also has jurisdiction over the
plaintiffs' claims of war crimes.47
While acts of genocide and war crimes are prohibited regardless of
who commits them, prohibitions of torture apply only to those acting
"under color of law." 8 In support of the prohibition on official torture,
39. 70 F.3d at 241.
40. Id., citing Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d
421, 425 2d Cir. 1987). rev'd on other grounds, 488 U.S. 428, 109 S.Ct. 683, 102
L.Ed.2d 818 (1989).
41. Id.
42. 78 U.N.T.S. 277, entered into force Jan. 12, 1951, for the United States
February 23, 1989.
43. 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (1988).
44. 70 F.3d at 241.
45. 70 F.3d at 242.





the Court cited the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, In-
human, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 9 the Torture Victim
Act,5" and the Filartiga decision.51 The court noted, however, that
many of the acts of torture alleged by the plaintiffs could be subsumed
under the other categories of violations, genocide and war crimes, pro-
vided that the plaintiffs could prove that the acts were committed as
part of a genocidal campaign or in the course of an armed conflict. 2
For purposes of determining jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals found it
sufficient "to hold... that the alleged atrocities are actionable under
the Alien Tort Act, without regard to state action, to the extent that
they were committed in pursuit of genocide or war crimes, and oth-
erwise may be pursued against Karadzic to the extent that he is shown
to be a state actor."53
Because Karadzic's status as a state actor would determine juris-
diction over the plaintiffs' torture claims, the Court of Appeals turned
its attention to the question of whether or not Srpska constitutes a
state under international law. The Court cited the Restatement's defi-
nition of a state as "an entity that has a defined territory and a per-
manent population, under the control of its own government, and that
engages in, or has the capacity to engage in, formal relations with
other such entities."5 This definition also reflects that found in the
Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States.55 The Re-
statement definition does not require that a state receive diplomatic
recognition from other states.5 6 The Court observes that while recog-
nized states "enjoy certain privileges and immunities relevant to judi-
cial proceedings, but an unrecognized state is not a juridical nulli-
ty."
57
Applying the standard for statehood to Srpska, the Court noted
that "Srpska is alleged to control defined territory, control populations
within its power, and to have entered into agreements with other gov-
49. Dec. 10, 1984, U.N.G.A. Res. 39/46 Annex, 39 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 51)
197, reprinted in I.L.M. 1027 (1984).
50. Pub.L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992), codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note
(Supp. V 1993).
51. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
52. 70 F.3d at 244
53. Id.
54. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS §201, cited with
approval in Id.
55. Article 1 of the Convention on the Rights and Duties of States provides that:
"The state as a person of internatiional law should possess the following qualifica-
tions: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d)
capacity to enter into relations with the other states."
Dec. 26, 1933, 49 State. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19.
56. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 202 cmt. b. See also Convention of the Rights and
Duties of States, art. 3, which states that the existence of a state is independent of
recognition by other states.
57. 70 F.3d at 244.
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ernments. It has a president, a legislature, and its own currency."58 In
the Court's view, these circumstances satisfied the requirements for
statehood. 9 The Court also noted that the standard for statehood
could be relaxed for purposes of fulfilling a "state action" requirement
for violations such as official torture. The relevant inquiry in such
cases is "whether a person purporting to wield official power has ex-
ceeded internationally recognized standards of civilized conduct, not
whether statehood in all its formal aspects exists."0 The "semblance
of official authority" can suffice for purposes of determining state ac-
tion. Acting in concert with a recognized state, such as Yugoslavia, can
also satisfy the requirement that an individual act "color of law."6
2. Personal Jurisdiction
Having satisfied the subject matter jurisdictional issues, the Court
of Appeals turned its attention to the sufficiency of service of process
and personal jurisdiction. Both the plaintiffs and Karadzic acknowl-
edge that process servers personally served Karadzic while he was
physically present in the Southern District of New York as an invitee
of the United Nations.62 Such personal service of process is authorized
under Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(e)(2), and complies with the requirements of the
Due Process clause.63
As a defense to this personal service, Karadzic claimed that he
was immune from service under the Agreement Between the United
Nations and the United States of America Regarding the Headquarters
of the United Nations ("Headquarters Agreement") and federal com-
mon law. Karadzic also asserted that the possibility of his recognition
as the head of state of a friendly country, which would entitly him to
immunity, should prohibit the exercise of personal jurisdiction over
him.
While the Headquarters Agreement does provide some immunity
from suit, this immunity is very narrowly defined. One constraint on
immunity is geographical. Within the well-defined U.N. headquarters
district, service of process requires the consent of the Secretary-Gener-
al.64 However, Karadzic was not within the headquarters district, as
defined by the Headquarters Agreement, when he was served in either
the Doe or Karadzic action.6 A second limitation entitles representa-
tives of U.N. member states to the same immunities as other diplo-




62. 70 F.3d at 246.





mats.6" This limitation does not apply to Karadzic either, because he
is not a designated representative of any member state.67 Karadzic
raised a third argument under the Headquarters Agreement. Based on
the prohibition on federal, state, and local U.S. authorities from imped-
ing the transit of U.N. invitees to or from the headquarters district,8
Karadzic argued that allowing service of process on a U.N. invitee
constituted a burden of the type prohibited by the Headquarters
Agreement. 9 The Court rejected Karadzic's argument, stating that
acceptance of Karadzic's claim would create a new immunity not in-
tended by the Headquarters Agreement.7 The language of the Head-
quarters Agreement does not support the extension of immunity
Karadzic sought, nor did it fall within the intention of the parties to
the Agreement.7
Aside from the arguments he raised under the Headquarters
Agreement, Karadzic claimed immunity from service under federal
common law. Drawing an analogy from the immunity that those on
government service in Washington, D.C., or those appearing for pur-
poses of litigation enjoy, Karadzic contended that he should enjoy simi-
lar immunity by virtue of his status as a U.N. invitee.7 2 The Court re-
jected Karadzic's claim of immunity under federal common law, claim-
ing that to do so would extend the immunities set forth in the Head-
quarters Agreement and create a new immunity not intended by the
United States or the United Nations.
Finally, Karadzic raised as a defense the possibility that in the
future, he may be recognized as a friendly head of state entitled to
immunity.7 ' While this argument held great weight with the District
Court, the Court of Appeals felt that to create such an immunity would
be inappropriate in light of the Executive Branch's failure to grant
Karadzic this recognition. 5
3. Justiciability
Karadzic challenged the appropriateness of the Court's exercising
its jurisdiction on the grounds of justiciability. 76 Specifically, Karadzic
raised challenges under the political question and act of state doc-
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the political question and the act of state doctrine both touch on the
issue of this case." While recognizing the potential of judicial action
to impact foreign policy, the Court rejected an absolute position that
every case "touching foreign relations" could not be adjudicated."8
Rather, the Court advocated examining each case individually, taking
into consideration judicial authority to act under §1350 and balancing
against that the political branches' primacy in setting foreign policy. 9
Karadzic alleged that the present question represents a
nonjusticiable political question, but the Court disagreed.'0 Citing the
Supreme Court's decision in Baker v. Carr,8 the Court of Appeals list-
ed six factors which could render an issue nonjusticiable:
(1) a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue
to a coordinate political department; or (2) a lack of judicially dis-
coverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or (3) the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or (4) the impossibility of a
court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack
of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or (5) an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision al-
ready made; or (6) the potentiality of embarassment from multi-
farious pronouncements by various departments on one question."s
While one or more of these factors could compromise the justiciability
of an issue, the Court found none of these factors present in Kadic v.
Karadzic. With regard to the first three Baker factors, the Court noted
that the adjudication of tort claims was constitutionally assigned to
the Judiciary, making a conflict in that respect impossible.' More-
over, "universally recognized norms of international law" could provide
discoverable and manageable standards for adjudicating ATCA cas-
es."' As for the last three Baker factors, the Court stated that these
applied only to cases where "judicial resolution of a question would
contradict prior decisions taken by a political branch in those limited
contexts where such contradiction would seriously interfere with im-
portant governmental interests."5
Karadzic also challenged the justiciability of this case because of
the act of state doctrine. The Court acknowledged that the act of state
doctrine, which restricts American courts' ability to judge the acts of a




81. 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962).
82. 70 F.3d at 249, citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 82 S.Ct. 691, 710.
83. 70 F.3d at 249.
84. Id.
85. 70 F.3d at 249.
VOL. 25:1
KADIC V. KARADZIC
foreign government within its own territory, can apply to some cases
that arise under §1350.86 While the act of state doctrine does limit
courts' capacity to exercise jurisdiction in some cases, it does not apply
to acts which are "taken in violation of a nation's fundamental law and
wholly unratified by that nation's government."87
After rejecting both the political question and the act of state
doctrine as barriers to the justiciability of Kadic v. Karadzic, the Court
derived comfort from reassurances the plaintiffs had received from the
Department of State after the commencement of their action.88 In re-
sponse to the plaintiffs' inquiry, the State Department replied that
"Karadzic was not immune from suit as an invitee of the United Na-
tions."89 The Court also sought and received reassurances from the
Attorney General.9" The Solicitor General and the Legal Adviser to
the State Department expressly denied the existence of a "political
question" in the present case.9 This denial by the Executive Branch
fortified the Court of Appeals' view "that adjudication may properly
proceed."92
III. SRPSKA'S OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
The Court's resolution of the jurisdictional issues does not resolve
all of the troublesome legal questions in this case. Specifically, the
Court failed to address the question of which standard of legal obliga-
tion should determine if Karadzic's conduct violated international law.
The Court of Appeals cited numerous multilateral treaties but failed to
address the issue of whether or not these treaties are binding upon
Srpska. Srpska's status as a new state highlights the complexity of
this issue, as its treaty obligations are uncertain. By imposing an im-
proper standard, the Court of Appeals may have overstepped its au-
thority by creating new obligations, rather than enforcing existing
ones.
A vital element of state sovereignty is the state's independence
from obligations that do not arise from the consent of the sovereign.
Clearly, this implies that each state's obligations under international
law will differ depending on which obligations the sovereign has cho-
sen to accept. The differences in states' obligations mean that an inqui-
ry as to whether or not a tort "in violation of the law of nations" has
taken place, as required by the ATCA, will yield varying results de-
pending on which state's obligations are considered.
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In the past, plaintiffs have raised ATCA claims against estab-
lished states with determined obligations under international law.
Kadic v. Karadzic brings the issue of legal obligations to the forefront
because Srpska, which the Court of Appeals found to exist as an unrec-
ognized state, is a new state with uncertain obligations under interna-
tional law. The doctrines of state succession and customary interna-
tional law raise questions about the nature and extent of Srpska's
obligations under international law. By applying American obligations
under international law, the District Court on remand could potential-
ly impose obligations on Srpska which it would not otherwise have,
merely by virtue of its head of state's physical presence in Manhattan.
A. State Succession
The law of state succession determines which "capacities, rights,
and duties of the predecessor state . . . are assumed by the successor
state" upon its creation.9" This body of law includes the rules that
apply to treaty obligations of new states. Unfortunately, the rules on
state succession and treaty obligations do not constitute a unified body
of rules. Authorities are divided between the "universal succession"
view, that the treaty obligations of the predecessor state continue once
the new state becomes independent, and the "clean slate" view, that
successor states can choose which of the predecessor state's obligations
continue.
The Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of
Treaties" supports the former view. However, this treaty lacks suffi-
cient ratifications and has not yet entered into force. The Vienna Con-
vention reflects the view of "universal succession," which holds that a
successor state inherits its territory from the predecessor, along with
the predecessor's personality and legal relationships.95 Due to wide-
spread contrary state practice, the "universal succession" view has
been replaced by the "clean slate" view of state succession, as reflected
in the Restatement. According to the "clean slate" rule, the successor
state "siezes what it can and repudiates what it will."96
The Restatement of the Law of Foreign Relations, in contrast to
the Vienna Convention, supports the "clean state" rule, which allows
the successor state to select which of the predecessor's treaty obliga-
tions it wishes to assume. The Restatement provides that
[w]hen part of a state becomes a new state, the new state does not
succeed to the international agreements to which the predecessor
state was a party, unless, expressly or by implication, it accepts
93. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) §208.
94. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 80/31, 72 AM. J. INTL L. 971 (1978).
95. D.P. O'CONNELL, THE LAW OF STATE SuccEssioN (1956) 6-7.
96. Id. at 8.
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such agreements and the other party or parties thereto agree or
acquiesce.'
Boundary and territorial agreements constitute the only exception to
this rule under the Restatement.98
Depending on which of these two rules is applied, Srpska may or
may not be bound automatically by Bosnia-Herzegovina's treaty obli-
gations. Assuming that the application of the Restatement's "clean
slate" rule would be appropriate in an American District Court, then
the extent of Srpska's treaty obligations depends upon which of
Bosnia-Herzegovina's treaty obligations Srpska has chosen to accept.
The issue becomes one of determining factually which treaty obliga-
tions Srpska has accepted, either implicitly or explicitly, and which
acceptances have been approved by the other parties to these agree-
ments.
The Court of Appeals cited several treaties in its review of the
international legal prohibitions against genocide, war crimes and tor-
ture. However, it failed to address the question of whether or not these
treaties bind Srpska. This issue must be addressed on remand by the
District Court. While these treaties cited by the Court of Appeals un-
doubtedly prohibit the torts alleged by the plaintiffs, if Srpska is not
bound by these treaties, then the Court of Appeals may have imposed
an obligation on a state, albeit an unrecognized one, to which that
state did not consent.
B. Customary International Law
As an alternative to their treaty-based claims, the plaintiffs could
raise their tort claims as violations of customary international law.
Internationally recognized custom can constitute a source of law, as
recognized in the Statute of the International Court of Justice.99 The
Restatement defines customary international law as "a general and
consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal
obligation."1" As this definition indicates, to become a rule of inter-
national law, a custom must be followed consistently by states, but
must also be supported by opinio juris, the view that the practice is
obligatory.
Consistent with the consensual nature of international law and its
limitation of obligations to those accepted by the sovereign, a state
which consistently objects to and fails to follow a custom from the
97. RESTATEMENT §210 (3).
98. RESTATEMENT §210 (4).
99. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1)(b), 59
Stat. 1031, U.N.T.S. 933.
100. RESTATEMENT (THiRD) §102(2).
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beginning is not bound by it, even if the custom should evolve into
customary international law.1"' The application of this exception to
Srpska would be dubious, because "when a new state comes into being
and is admitted into the community of nations, it is bound by all rules
of international law originating in custom."1" Karadzic could argue,
as a defense, that because Srpska has not been recognized by other
states and thereby "admitted to the community of nations," he should
not be held accountable for violating the rules generated by this com-
munity.
To the degree that human rights norms have evolved into rules of
customary international law, Srpska would still be bound by the norms
even though it may not be a party to the corresponding treaty. In this
case, plaintiffs would have a strong argument that genocide, war
crimes and official torture violate customary international law."°u
While Srpska is bound by norms of international law, the source of the
obligation differs if it is not a party to the treaties cited by the Court
of Appeals. To the extent that the treaties reflect rules of customary
international law, the distinction makes no difference. If these treaties,
or treaties cited in a future case, do not reflect customary international
law, then the effect of a court's citing them creates, rather than enforc-
es, an obligation under international law.
IV. CONCLUSION
The ATCA provides a mechanism for U.S. Federal Courts to en-
force foreign states' obligations under international law which may
otherwise remain unenforced. Kadic v. Karadzic highlights the degree
to which Courts must take care to apply international law appropri-
ately. Because the effect of state succession on treaty obligations re-
mains unclear, due to the existence of multiple and conflicting
standards, Srpska's treaty obligations are subject to argument.
Applying the Restatement's "clean slate" view, the District Court
must examine whether or not Srpska has become a party to any of
Bosnia-Herzegovina's treaty obligations (which would derive, in turn,
from Yugoslavia's obligations) through Srpska's acceptance and the
accession by the other parties. If Srpska has not accepted the treaty
obligations cited by the Court as evidence of international law, the
101. While states are bound to follow rules of customary international law, they
are not bound to consent to the formation of a new rule. Should that rule eventually
attain status as customary international law, the "persistent objector" will not be
bound by it. Karol Wolfke, Custom in Present International Law (2d rev. ed. 1993)
66-67. For an application of this rule, see the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases
(Denmark v. FRG; the Netherlands v. FRG) 1969 I.C.J. 3.
102. GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 22.




Court must further inquire as to whether or not the treaty rules repre-
sent customary international law.
If the Court has cited treaties to which Srpska is not a party, and
which does not represent customary international law, then it has
applied international law inappropriately. In the present case, this
issue is largely moot because prohibitions against genocide, war crimes
and official torture are widely regarded as rules of customary interna-
tional law. Even if Srpska has not become a party to the Geneva Con-
ventions, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, or the Convention Against Torture and Other Cru-
el, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, plaintiffs have a
strong argument that the standards still apply to Srpska and to
Karadzic by virtue of their status as customary international law.
In future cases, the norms embodied by the treaty in question
may not enjoy the status of customary international law. In such an
instance, the Court would be going beyond enforcing international law
by creating an obligation on a state to which the state had not given
its consent. By inappropriately applying treaties to which the
defendant's state may not be a party, or rules of customary interna-
tional law by which the state is not bound, the Court would be creat-
ing new rights which the plaintiff would not have in the courts of his
or her own country. To do so would go beyond an appropriate use of
the ATCA to enforce international legal obligations and become an
abuse of the courts' authority.
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